

EPAMINONDAS AND THE GENESIS OF THE SOCIAL WAR

Between 357/6 and 355/4 B.C. Athens fought the so-called Social War with rebellious members of the Second Athenian League, which resulted in the permanent loss of the league's wealthiest members, Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes.¹ While there is little doubt about the events of the war itself, the developments that led to the war are not clearly understood. Diodorus, who provides the only extended narrative of the Social War (Diod. 16.7.3–4, 22.1–2), begins his account with the notice (16.7.3) that

οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι Χίων καὶ Ῥοδίων καὶ Κώων, ἔτι δὲ Βυζαντίων ἀποστάντων ἐνέπεσον εἰς πόλεμον τὸν ὀνομασθέντα συμμαχικόν, ὃς διέμεινεν ἔτη τρία.

The Athenians, who had suffered the revolt of Chios, Rhodes, and Cos and, moreover of Byzantium, became involved in the war called the Social War, which lasted three years.²

Diodorus often severely condensed Ephorus,³ his primary source for Books 11–16, and this passage appears to be the result of such condensation. Here we have revolts linked in some way to the outbreak of war but nothing about how or why these revolts took place and, given Diodorus' use of the genitive absolute construction, no clear indication of their chronology. Consequently, scholars commonly turn to Demosthenes' remarks about league members' complaints against Athens (Dem. 15.15) or his warnings about the ambitions of the Carian dynast/satrap Mausolus (15.3), and argue that the threat of revived Athenian imperialism or meddling by Mausolus lay behind the revolts. Persuaded perhaps that the close proximity of Diodorus' reference to allied revolts in 16.7.3 to his account of the Social War indicates a close chronological connection between the revolts and the war itself, scholars almost unanimously date the revolts, with the possible exception of that of Byzantium, to the early 350s, shortly before the beginning of the war.⁴

However, Diodorus may provide more information than what is in 16.7.3. In Book 15 under the year 364/3 he reports that the Theban commander Epaminondas led a naval force to Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes and made these cities "Thebes' own" (15.79.1). The wording Diodorus uses (ἰδίας τὰς πόλεις τοῖς Θεβαίοις ἐποίησεν) certainly seems to indicate that Epaminondas established alliances between Thebes and Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium at this time,⁵ and given Athenian-Theban enmity in the 360s this would constitute a break by these states with Athens and the Second Athenian League. If these defections are what Diodorus has in mind in 16.7.3 when

1. The chronology cited here (a year later than what Diodorus [16.7.3] indicates) follows K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, vol. 3, part 2 (Berlin and Leipzig, 1923), 258–60. Cf. G. Cawkwell, "Notes on the Social War," *Classica et Mediaevalia* 23 (1962): 34–40.

2. Translation by C. L. Sherman, *Diodorus of Sicily*, vol. 7, Loeb Classical Library (1963).

3. G. L. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus* (Cambridge, 1935), 34–35; C. Rubincam, "The Organization and Composition of Diodorus' *Bibliothēke*," *EMC/CV* 31 (1987): 314–15.

4. G. Cawkwell, "Notes on the Failure of the Second Athenian Confederacy," *JHS* 101 (1981): 52–53; J. Buckler, *The Theban Hegemony* (Cambridge, MA, 1980), 171; J. Cargill, *The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance?* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1981), 178–79, 193; S. Hornblower, *Mausolus* (Oxford, 1982), 209.

5. As Hornblower, *Mausolus*, p. 200, n. 37, points out with citations to Diod. 11.44.6 and 19.46.1, translations such as "friendly" are too weak.

he briefly mentions allied revolts, we can understand the Social War more fully and accurately as a consequence of defections precipitated by Epaminondas in 364/3.⁶ We can also understand why Diodorus prefaced his narrative of the Social War in Book 16 with such a terse notice of allied revolts: he knew he had already reported the circumstances surrounding the revolts when he recounted Epaminondas' activities in Book 15, and he needed at this point only a resumptive note to remind his readers of the background to the Social War.

But can we trust Diodorus' information about Epaminondas' activities? Because there is no evidence of continuing links between Thebes and Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes after 364/3, scholars commonly reject Diodorus' report of Epaminondas' successes in 364/3 as exaggerated or utterly mistaken.⁷ A fresh look at what Diodorus tells us happened in 364/3 and at what we know of circumstances in the mid-360s may help to settle the question.

According to Diodorus, Epaminondas' tour resulted from a vote taken in 364/3 by the Theban δῆμος "to construct one hundred ships and dockyards sufficient in number for them and to urge the Rhodians, Chians, and Byzantines to assist their plans." "Their plans" were what Epaminondas had advocated in the speech the δῆμος had heard just before voting: to strive for naval hegemony (Diod. 15.78.4–79.1). Diodorus' description of the vote indicates that the proposed ship construction and urging of assistance by the Rhodians, Chians, and Byzantines were to be simultaneous, not sequential, enterprises. In other words, the diplomatic urging would commence about the same time the building of ships did. Thus when immediately after his notice of the assembly's vote Diodorus reports that Epaminondas, having been dispatched with a force to the cities mentioned, overawed an Athenian fleet under Laches and made the cities "Thebes' own," we may conclude that this was the urging voted on in the Theban decree. There is no reason, in other words, to assume that Epaminondas sailed with the hundred-ship fleet the δῆμος had commissioned, or that he undertook a wide-ranging tour of "liberation" that touched as many member states of the Second Athenian League as possible.⁸

6. The fact that Cos appears in Diodorus' list of rebel states in 16.7.3 but is not among the defectors mentioned in 15.78.1 need not prohibit us from understanding 15.78.1 and 16.7.3 as referring to the same events. Cos was not a member of the Second Athenian League (S. M. Sherwin-White, *Ancient Cos: An Historical Study from the Dorian Settlement to the Imperial Period* [Göttingen, 1978], 42–43); it cannot have revolted and so does not belong among the rebel states listed in 16.7.3. Most likely, Diodorus put it there because he found Cos mentioned as an ally of Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes in Ephorus' narrative of the Social War and assumed that Cos' involvement, like that of these states, must have been due to a previous, albeit unrecorded rupture with Athens and the Second Athenian League.

7. F. A. Marshall, *The Second Athenian Confederacy* (Cambridge, 1905), 96–97, esp. n. 5; S. Accame, *La lega ateniese del secolo IV a. C.* (Rome, 1941), p. 179, n. 3; M. Fortina, *Epaminonda* (Turin, 1958), 84; G. L. Cawkwell, "Epaminondas and Thebes," *CQ* 22 (1972): 270–73; Buckler, *Theban Hegemony*, 171–73; R. M. Berthold, "Fourth-Century Rhodes," *Historia* 29 (1980): 41–42; Cargill, *Second Athenian League*, 169.

8. It is likely that Diodorus' report that Epaminondas scared off Laches (Λάχητα . . . καταπληξάμενος καὶ ἀποπλεύσαι συναναγκάσας) has led scholars to ascribe to Epaminondas a fleet larger than Laches' reportedly sizable fleet (στόλον ἀξιόλογον) and thus to assume that the new hundred-ship Theban fleet or a large part of it was involved. In order then to give Thebes enough time to construct all these ships, some scholars (e.g., Buckler, *Theban Hegemony*, 161) push back the vote to construct ships to 365/4 or earlier. Others (e.g., J. Wiseman, "Epaminondas and the Theban Invasions," *Klio* 51 [1969]: 95–97) delay Epaminondas' voyage until 363/2. However, as Cawkwell has suggested ("Epaminondas and Thebes," 271), it is just as possible that political concerns rather than military ones lay behind Laches' unwillingness to engage and his flight need not imply anything about the size of Epaminondas' fleet.

We have no evidence about the order in which Epaminondas visited the three cities, but since Epaminondas was carrying out the explicit instructions of the δῆμος—to urge the Rhodians, Chians, and Byzantines to help the Thebans—and since there is no evidence of any opposition after Laches declined an encounter, we can assume that Epaminondas indeed visited all three cities.

The reason for Epaminondas' and Thebes' interest in these particular cities seems clear. In addition to being important maritime states, Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes were what might be called the founding members of the Second Athenian League. They had all allied with Athens in the late 380s or early 370s before the foundation of the League in 377 and the Second Athenian League, it could be said, represented the augmentation of an already existing *συνμαχία* comprising Athens, Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium.⁹ The invitation contained in the charter of the Second Athenian League was after all “to be an ally of the Athenians and their allies” (Ἀθηναίων σύμμαχος εἶναι καὶ τῶν συμμάχων), not merely of the Athenians.¹⁰ Detaching these particular states from Athens and joining them to Thebes would thus strike at the very heart of the Athenian League—would in fact announce Thebes' usurpation of Athens' hegemonial role by placing Thebes in Athens' position in the core *συνμαχία* around which the Second Athenian League had been constructed.¹¹

Most important for Epaminondas was probably not naval hegemony itself but rather the demonstration that Athens held no such hegemony and that the Persian king Artaxerxes II therefore ought not to view Athens as a power capable of controlling Greek affairs. This had in fact been the Theban diplomatic aim several years earlier when Pelopidas as Thebes' envoy to Susa successfully made the case for Artaxerxes' sponsoring a Theban-proposed peace on the mainland and transferring his support from Athens (or Sparta) to Thebes as *προστάτης* or supervisor of the peace. On the evidence of recent military victories, especially in the Peloponnese, Thebes was indeed clearly the dominant land power, and, persuaded of this, Artaxerxes had shifted his backing away from Athens to Thebes in 367 (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.35–36; Plut. *Pelop.* 30.3–4).

The Thebans, however, had not been notably successful in imposing their version of a new King's Peace on mainland Greeks. Invited to Thebes in late 367 to hear the terms of the proposed peace, Greek envoys had refused to join in the Theban-led peace. The best Thebes had been able to do was conclude a few individual peace agreements—but not alliances—in 366 with Corinth, Argos, Phlius, and some other unnamed Peloponnesian states. Despite its military successes in the early 360s

9. M. N. Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1948), nos. 118 (Chios) and 121 (Byzantium); Accame, *La lega*, 15–16.

10. Tod, *GHI*, 123, ll. 15–20.

11. For this reason, states such as Iulis and others on Ceos, which seem to have revolted about this time (Tod, *GHI*, 142), were not likely to be of particular significance in Thebes' plans, and we should probably view revolts that occurred here as spontaneous reactions to the emergence of a potential and not necessarily pro-democratic maritime rival to Athens, rather than as revolts directly instigated by Epaminondas; contra, e.g., Marshall, *Second Athenian Confederacy*, 96–97; F. Carrata Thomes, *Egemonia beotica é potenza marittima nella politica di Epaminonda* (Turin, 1952), 33; Fortina, *Epaminonda*, 84.

Although the Lesbian states of Mytilene and Methymna were also “charter members” of the Second Athenian League, they were evidently neither targeted by the Theban assembly nor visited by Epaminondas. As smaller, less prosperous states than Byzantium, Chios, or Rhodes, Theban detachment of them from the Second Athenian League would likely have had much less symbolic significance than Theban detachment of Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes.

and its enjoyment of Persian favor, Thebes thus had by 365 only a shaky claim to *προστασία* of mainland Greek affairs.¹²

On the other hand, Athenian activities after 367 had demonstrated that Athens was still a power to be reckoned with. After Artaxerxes' adoption of a pro-Theban stance in 367, which not only deprived the Athenians of their recently asserted *προστασία* but also put the king's weight behind Theban demands that Athens abandon claims to Amphipolis and demobilize her fleet,¹³ Athenian belligerence had flared up immediately. The assembly voted to execute the Athenian envoy to the recent peace conference at Susa and evidently also to erase from the foundation stele of the Second Athenian League the lines recording guarantees of continued observance of friendship and peace with the king.¹⁴ The Athenians had next moved to military measures, apparently believing that they might prompt Artaxerxes to resume his longstanding philo-Athenian posture by reminding him of the potency of the Athenian fleet. In mid-366 they dispatched Timotheus son of Conon (the architect of Athenian naval reconstruction in the 390s) with thirty ships and 8,000 troops to aid Ariobarzanes, the rebellious satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia who was resisting Artaxerxes' attempts to replace him (Isoc. 15.111; Dem. 15.9).

The size of Timotheus' force was comparable to that commanded by Thrasybulus in the expedition heralding renewal of Athenian involvement in the eastern Aegean and western Anatolia in 390 (Xen. *Hell.* 4.25.1; Diod. 14.94.2). But the assembly, despite the recent erasure of the lines in the league foundation stele evidently referring to observance of the King's Peace, explicitly instructed Timotheus to aid Ariobarzanes but not to violate the treaty with the king.¹⁵ Clearly, Athens' intention was to make a show of force but not give the king grounds for declaring war.

Of course, Artaxerxes and Persian officials in Anatolia would have had no knowledge of the limitations imposed on Timotheus' operations. Thus when Timotheus, instead of aiding Ariobarzanes directly, moved to Samos, the base from which Athens had undertaken many naval operations against Anatolian Greek sites during the latter stages of the Peloponnesian War, and there initiated a siege, Persians and other observers had good reason to believe that the Athenians were disavowing their twenty-year long peace and friendship with the king and embarking on new aggression perhaps aimed ultimately at restoring Athenian influence or control over the Greek cities of Asia.¹⁶ Timotheus' lengthy siege of Samos—lasting ten months before the city fell—must certainly have seemed to signal Athenian determination about

12. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.39–40, 4.6–11. Xenophon himself writes off Thebes as *προστάτης* in 367/6, asserting that the failure of the peace conference at Thebes and of the plan to seek agreement to the proposed peace through visits to individual states brought an end to Thebes' attempt at *ἀρχή* (*Hell.* 7.1.40).

13. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.36; Plut. *Pelop.* 30.5; Dem. 19.137.

14. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.38 (execution of Timagoras); Cargill, *Second Athenian League*, 31–32, 192 (possible erasure of clause concerning King's Peace).

15. Nep. *Timotheus* 1.3; Isoc. 15.111; Dem. 15.9. On Thrasybulus, see Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.25; Diod. 14.94.2.

16. Dem. 15.9; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 3.17.9–10; Xen. *Ages.* 2.26. Demosthenes' notice that at the time of Timotheus' attack on Samos the island was garrisoned by a certain Cyprothemis, who had been stationed there by Tigranes (otherwise unknown), a "hyparch of the king," has frequently been taken to indicate Persian violation of the autonomy provision (for states outside Asia) of the King's Peace (e.g., Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 187; Cargill, *Second Athenian League*, 171; cf. G. Shipley, *A History of Samos* [Oxford, 1987], 137, who sees Mausolus behind this garrison). It is entirely possible, however, that the garrison represented a preemptive measure in response to Athenian naval enterprise in the eastern Aegean. Samos had been Athens' major Aegean naval base, and Samians and others, aware of Athens' new bellicosity, might well expect Athens to try to use Samos again. Bitterly anti-Athenian oligarchs held Samos (ever since the end of the

securing a vital eastern Aegean naval base. Timotheus' and Athens' subsequent actions in 365 undoubtedly offered to contemporary observers further proof that Athens was intent on establishing a renewed presence in the eastern Aegean. Following the fall of Samos, Timotheus sailed to the Hellespont and there seized Sestus, the major coastal site overlooking entry to the Hellespont, and Crithote.¹⁷ During summer 365, reviving a practice characteristic of fifth-century Athenian imperialism, Athens sent a contingent of cleruchs to Samos with, it appears, a permanent naval guard.¹⁸

Diodorus' parenthetical remark about Epaminondas' speech in 364/3 advocating pursuit of naval hegemony (that it was something he had contrived over a long period of time, 15.78.4) may well indicate that Athens' maritime initiative, which served to demonstrate Athens' continuing potency, almost immediately prompted Epaminondas to begin to think of ways to counter the appearance of Athenian power.¹⁹ Epaminondas well knew from the clause that Artaxerxes had appended in 367 to the Theban-proposed peace—that "if the Athenians come to know anything more just than these things they should come to the king and instruct him" (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.37)—that Artaxerxes would not hesitate to resume a pro-Athenian policy if circumstances warranted it. Ultimately, it appears, Epaminondas fashioned a strategy of laying claim to a naval ἀρχή to demonstrate for Artaxerxes' benefit that, recent successes notwithstanding, the Athenians had no mastery over the Aegean, that in fact they could not even hold onto their oldest and most important allies, and that despite Thebes' poor performance as προστάτης there was no good reason for Artaxerxes to conciliate the Athenians and abandon the pro-Theban stance he had adopted in 367. In other words, just like Athens' maritime initiative in 366/5, the naval tour Epaminondas planned and proposed aimed at influencing Artaxerxes' perceptions of Greek affairs rather than achieving any special military goals.

Assuming for the moment that, as Diodorus states in 15.79.1, Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium did in fact join with Thebes as a result of Epaminondas' visits, what might explain their willingness to do so? Since league membership involved no requirement to provide ships or troops and league procedure prevented Athens from unilaterally raising members' contribution levels,²⁰ recent Athenian operations certainly had not imposed any burdens on member states. Furthermore, recent Athenian actions were not in any way violations of the terms (for example, prohibition of cleruchies) of the league foundation agreement that constrained the Athenians in their dealings with member states but not with non-members such as Samos, Sestus, or Crithote. There is thus no reason to conjecture that Byzantium, Rhodes, and Chios broke with Athens in the belief that Athens might soon visit such measures on them.

Peloponnesian War), and they might well seek support in the form of a garrison as quickly as possible. Conceivably, Cyprothemis was a Greek mercenary commander heading a mercenary contingent sent to Samos by a Persian official and paid for by the Samians themselves.

17. Isoc. 15.108, 112; Nep. *Timotheus* 1.3; Buckler, *Theban Hegemony*, 167–68.

18. Cleruchs: Heraclid. Pont., *FHG* 2.216; Diod. 18.8.9; Strabo 14.1.18; J. Cargill, "IG II² and the Athenian Kleruchy on Samos," *GRBS* 24 (1983): 321–32. The naval force the Athenian general Leosthenes summoned from Samos to join in a blockade of Peparethos in 361 (Polyaenus, *Strat.* 6.2.1; Cawkwell, "Notes," 48) might well have been stationed on Samos since the arrival of Athenian cleruchs to prevent the many exiled Samians from returning.

19. We may infer from Diodorus' remark that Ephorus made some comment about Epaminondas' concern at the time of Athens' maritime enterprise in 366 and later returned to the consequence of this concern—the plan Epaminondas proposed in 364/3.

20. M. Dreher, *Hegemon und Symmachoi. Untersuchungen zum Zweiten Athenischen Seebund* (Berlin and New York, 1995), 34–38, 60.

What these states most likely did anticipate and fear in the mid-360s was that Athenian actions would lead to hostilities between Athens and Persia and that continued alliance with Athens would put them at great risk in the event of an Athenian-Persian war.

To contemporaries, Athenian actions in 366/5 must have evoked memories not so much of fifth-century imperial Athenian practices as of Athenian undertakings in 390–388. Then, as in 366/5, after a lengthy interval of non-intervention in Aegean or Anatolian affairs following the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians had launched an aggressive campaign (with a fleet similar in size to that which Timotheus led in 366/5) and recovered control of various Aegean islands, Anatolian Greek cities, and the Hellespont (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.25–31; Diod. 14.94.1–2). As in the late 390s and the beginning of the 380s, the Spartans—angered like the Athenians by Artaxerxes’ Thebanizing policies—were in 366/5 also at odds with Persia, and a Spartan king and general (Agésilas) was active in western Anatolia, albeit without Spartan troops (Xen. *Ages.* 2.26). Further similarities between the 390–388 situation and that in 366/5 existed in the absence of full imperial control over Anatolia: in the earlier period due to Spartan control of portions of western Anatolia, in the mid-360s due to rebellions by satraps of Hellespontine Phrygia (Ariobarzanes) and Cappadocia (Datames).²¹

In 390–388, there had been no immediate response by Artaxerxes II to Athenian naval enterprise. So in 366/5 Artaxerxes had made no swift retaliatory or preemptive move against Athens. Nevertheless, contemporaries could probably expect that as in 390–388 this would not remain the case indefinitely. Ultimately, Artaxerxes had resolved the 390–388 situation by concluding peace with Sparta and then employing Spartan ships and generals in conjunction with ships from cities controlled by Tiribazus, satrap of Lydia, to attack Athenian-held sites and deprive Athens of control of the Hellespont and thereby compel Athens’ withdrawal from Anatolian affairs and demobilization of the Athenian fleet (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.25–35).

Epaminondas’ display of Theban naval initiative and news of a big Theban naval construction project must have suggested that Thebes would be able to play the role in an Athenian-Persian conflict that Sparta had played in 387 (and in 412–405 for that matter)—carrying on a naval war against Athens in the eastern Aegean on behalf of the king. Thebes may not yet have had a full complement of ships, but with a naval construction program now underway, Thebes could soon have a sizable fleet. And whatever numbers of the Theban fleet might be deployed in the eastern Mediterranean, contemporaries could expect a Theban fleet to be augmented by ships from the standing fleet belonging to the Carian dynast/satrap Mausolus,²² just as

21. Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.40; Nep. *Datames* 8.5–6. If there was indeed a rebel coalition ultimately involving all satraps and officials in Anatolia (thus Diod. 15.90.1–91.7 but denied by M. Weiskopf, *The So-Called “Great Satraps’ Revolt,” 366–360 B.C.* Historia Einzelschriften, 64 [Stuttgart, 1989]), this probably took shape only in ca. 362/1; S. Ruzicka, *Politics of a Persian Dynasty: The Hecatomnids in the Fourth Century B.C.* (Norman, OK, 1992), 76–79.

22. Mausolus reportedly deployed one hundred ships in operations against Ariobarzanes, the rebellious satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, in 366/5 (Xen. *Hell.* 2.26), so the projected hundred-ship Theban fleet could become part of a fleet twice its size. By 362/1 Mausolus would himself be part of a coalition of disaffected satraps in western Anatolia (Diod. 15.90.3), but there is no reason to date his defection much before 362/1; see Ruzicka, *Persian Dynasty*, 76–78. In 364/3, Mausolus probably still seemed to contemporary observers a loyal official who, given Athenian seizure of Samos right off the Carian coast, had special reason to join anti-Athenian operations.

Spartan ships had been joined by ships provided by Tiribazus, satrap of Lydia, for operations against Athenian forces in 387.

Thebes, after all, had been anointed by Artaxerxes in 367 as the Persian-backed hegemon in Greek affairs. Whether Persian funds were largely responsible for the creation of the new Theban fleet is not known,²³ but contemporaries, remembering Persian funding of Athens' own naval construction program in the later 390s (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.6–12; Diod. 14.84.3–5), will probably have assumed so. Contemporaries will likely have concluded further that Thebes would be acting whenever necessary at Persian behest, and, given recent Athenian provocation, this would mean attacks on Athenian interests.

If, then, hostile operations aimed at Athenian interests seemed a likely prospect once the Thebans launched a fleet that could function on Persian behalf, it would be easy for interested onlookers to predict what such operations might involve. The effective strategy for bringing Athens to heel, proven already at the end of the Peloponnesian War and in 387, was to deprive Athens of naval bases in the Aegean, or at least keep Athenian ships busy trying to hold important bases, and seize control of the Hellespont to prevent shipment of grain from the Black Sea to Athens. What such a strategy would mean in specific terms in the mid-360s was attacks on important Athenian allies such as Rhodes, which was the major naval base in the southern Aegean and a major stopping point on the Egypt-Athens grain route, Chios, which lay almost directly opposite Athens and off roughly the mid-point of the western Anatolian coast, and Byzantium, located right at the entry point to the all-important Black Sea.²⁴ All these states had been in the middle of hostilities in earlier conflicts. In 364/3, they could plausibly anticipate a recurrence when and if Theban and perhaps also Carian ships sought to challenge Athens on Artaxerxes' behalf.

Typically, war had also meant stasis—factional strife—and often revolution. Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes may all have been democratic in the mid-360s,²⁵ but if they stuck with Athens in conflict with Persia, and Athens then failed, democracies in places like Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes might well be replaced by oligarchic regimes. War, in other words, involved real political as well as military risks.

The prospect of war also raised the specter of economic disaster. Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes were the major Eastern Greek commercial states. They all lay on or were connected to the very busy trade route paralleling the western Anatolian coastline and all served as important points of exchange in the flourishing commercial world of the eastern Aegean. War would predictably dampen much of the commercial activity in this region and quite likely involve destruction of ships belonging to participating states, whatever the eventual outcome.

Here then are circumstances and concerns which may best explain Epaminondas' reported success in 364/3 in making Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes "Thebes' own." These states had every reason to distance themselves from Athens at this time and no good reason to stick with their Athenian alliances. If they allied instead with

23. There is no direct testimony about it, but Theban receipt of Persian funds is most plausible. Artaxerxes was very generous to Greek envoys at Susa in 367 (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.38; Plut. *Pelop.* 30.6), and quite likely Pelopidas, favored most of all, returned home with money to advance the peace; cf. Antalcidas in 371 (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.1) and Philiscus in 368 (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.27; Diod. 15.70.2).

24. Cf. Buckler, *Theban Hegemony*, 170–71.

25. Demosthenes' speech *On Behalf of the Freedom of the Rhodians* (15) depicts widespread adoption of oligarchy by eastern Greeks, including Chios and Rhodes, in the 350s, implying previous democracies; see Dem. 15.19 and *passim*.

Thebes and announced thereby the closing of their harbors to Athenian warships, there might well be no war at all. But if Athens persisted, the Byzantines, Chians, and Rhodians, no longer Athenian allies, would not be the foci of any Persian/Theban anti-Athenian strategy, and they could hope that Theban and Carian ships together with their own ships would suffice to ward off any Athenian attempts to retaliate and regain footholds.

It is not surprising that Diodorus' narrative of Epaminondas' 364/3 naval expedition is rather brief and free of circumstantial detail. Since the mere appearance of a Theban fleet in the Aegean along with news of Theban naval construction undoubtedly raised apprehensions of imminent Persian-backed anti-Athenian warfare, Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, Athens' major naval allies, probably moved immediately to divest themselves of damning Athenian ties, demonstrated their pro-Persian posture by joining instead with Thebes, and did what they could to avert possible war in the eastern Aegean.²⁶

We may conclude, therefore, that defections by Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes in 364/3 are eminently plausible and that we can trust Diodorus' report of such defections in 15.79.1.

But even if, as Diodorus says, Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes joined with Thebes (and thus, in effect, broke with Athens) in 364/3, did these defecting states remain alienated from Athens and the Second Athenian League from 364/3 through 357/6?

In the case of Byzantium, we know of Byzantine attacks on Athenian grain ships in the late 360s, so the answer seems to be yes.²⁷ In the cases of Chios and Rhodes, we have only the argument from silence: there is no mention of Athenian recovery or restoration of these states to contributing league membership between 364/3 and 357/6. That is, of course, hardly decisive, but if we accept the likelihood of Chian and Rhodian defections in 364/3, then circumstantial evidence can buttress the argument from silence. Such evidence suggests no likely time when any of these states might have rejoined the league. During the late 360s the Athenians were preoccupied with more pressing problems elsewhere: attempts to regain Amphipolis, reaction to the naval campaigns by the aggressive Thessalian leader, Alexander of Phraeae, and reactions to conquests in the Thracian Chersonese by the Thracian king Cotys.²⁸ The only known Athenian enterprise in the eastern Aegean between 364/3 and 358/7, the dispatch of additional Athenian cleruchs to Samos in 361/0, was most probably a defensive measure.²⁹

26. The absence of any further Theban naval operations after 364/3 may be a sign not of the failure of Epaminondas' naval strategy (as, e.g., Buckler, *Theban Hegemony*, 174–75) but rather of its complete success in 364/3. Once Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes broke with Athens there was no reason for renewed Theban maritime enterprise.

27. Byzantine attacks: Dem. 5.25; 50.17; [Dem.] 45.64; [Arist.] *Oec.* 2.1346c29–30, 1347b24–25; Nep. *Timotheus* 1.2 reports without any circumstantial detail that *Timotheus Olynthios et Byzantios bello subegit*. There seems, however, to be no basis for such a statement. Had *Timotheus* ever actually taken Byzantium, Isocrates surely would have mentioned it in the *Antidosis*, where he devotes an extended laudatory passage to listing *Timotheus'* conquests to illustrate his assertion that *Timotheus* had taken more cities than any other Greek commander (15.105–13). Possibly *Timotheus* made a move against Byzantium while engaged in operations in Hellespontine Thrace against Cotys (and at the same time against Amphipolis in connection with which he probably fought the Olynthians) in late 363 (see Dem. 23.149–50), but this is all. R. Weise, *Der athenische Bundesgenossenkrieg* (Berlin, 1895), 13, argues this well; cf. Accame, *La lega*, p. 179, n. 3.

28. P. Cloché, *La Politique étrangère d'Athènes de 404 à 338 avant J.-C.* (Paris, 1934), 130–31, 137; Dem. 23.158, 161; 50.4; Hyperides 3.1; Diod. 15.95.1–2; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 6.2.2; Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.35.

29. Schol. Aeschin. 1.53. The Athenians may have feared that their preoccupation with other affairs might prompt previously exiled Samians or Mausolus to attempt to dislodge Athenian cleruchs from Samos.

If Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes broke with Athens in 364/3 and never subsequently resumed membership in the Second Athenian League, we have to conclude that the Byzantine, Chian, and Rhodian revolts that Diodorus in 16.7.3 links with the outbreak of the Social War are those precipitated by Epaminondas in 364/3.

How then can we explain the outbreak of war in 356? We may be able to piece together some scattered bits of evidence from Diodorus and elsewhere to explain the final steps to the Social War itself.

What we find is evidence of new Athenian interest in league affairs in the early 350s: in 357 they campaigned on Euboea and renewed alliances with league members there who had broken with Athens in favor of Thebes in 370; in the same year, they compelled Thracian Greek cities that Cotys had previously detached from Athens to pay “contributions.”³⁰ What probably explains this is the fact that, thanks to Philip’s withdrawal of support for Amphipolis in 359 and Alexander of Pherae’s death in 358,³¹ the Athenians were free for the first time in years from more pressing concerns and able to deal assertively with league matters.

In such circumstances the Athenians certainly would have put pressure on Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, the most significant defectors, and Isocrates’ reference (8.36) to belligerent demands by Athenian orators that those who failed to pay συντάξεις should not be allowed to sail the seas may attest Athenian ultimatums demanding that rebellious allies resume active membership or face the threat of attack. Artaxerxes II’s death in 359 or early 358 and the likelihood of distracting Persian succession intrigues probably gave Athenians—and Athens’ former allies—reason to expect that Athenian ships could operate freely in the eastern Aegean to back up threatening ultimatums.³² In the face of Athens’ evident determination, Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes might now (358/7?) have submitted. After all, nothing had ever come of their Theban alliances and Epaminondas himself was long dead, a casualty of Mantinea in 362.

What kept Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes from yielding to Athens was evidently an invitation from Mausolus to join a new alliance. This we may gather from Demosthenes’ retrospective charge that Mausolus was the “prime instigator and persuader” of the *συνμαχία* the Athenians faced in the Social War (15.3), a charge implying that without Mausolus there would have been no *συνμαχία* and no Social War. We may plausibly conjecture that promises of support from Mausolus, who after Athens’ seizure of Samos several years earlier had his own reasons for opposing any Athenian maritime enterprise, emboldened Athens’ recalcitrant allies to reject Athenian demands. This then led in short order to Athens’ attack on Chios in early 356, which initiated the Social War, some seven years after Epaminondas originally detached Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes from Athens and the Second Athenian League.

On the basis of this reconstruction of the genesis of the Social War, Diodorus still appears guilty of excessive condensation. While he does report—in Book 15—when and why the allied revolts took place, he nowhere discusses how Athenian activities and policies in the early 350s led to the outbreak of war.

Cawkwell, “Notes,” 55, points to grain shortages at Athens at this time and suggests that economic considerations may lie behind the sending of additional cleruchs to Samos.

30. Euboea: Diod. 16.7.2; Aeschin. 3.85; Tod, *GHI*, 153, 154; Thrace: Tod, *GHI*, 151; Dem. 23.175.

31. Philip: Diod. 16.3.3; Alexander of Pherae: Diod. 15.61.2; 16.14.1.

32. Diod. 15.93.1; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 7.17; R. A. Parker and H. W. Dubberstein, *Babylonian Chronology, 626 B.C.–A.D. 753* (Providence, RI, 1956), 19, 35; Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, 3.2: 129–31.

It may be suspected, however, that Diodorus knew nothing about these developments. Ephorus apparently did not concentrate on Athenian affairs in his treatment of the 350s, placing Philip of Macedon instead at center stage,³³ and Diodorus may not have found in Ephorus any discussion of Athenian dealings with Byzantium, Chios, or Rhodes immediately preceding the outbreak of the Social War. As a result, when Diodorus came to Ephorus' account of the Social War itself, which perhaps began with his report of the Athenian attack on Chios, all Diodorus could do by way of explaining the genesis of the war was to refer to those events he did know about that were linked to the Social War: the allied defections precipitated by Epaminondas in 364/3. Ephorus had treated these in an earlier book of his history, and, following him, so had Diodorus. Diodorus therefore may have assumed—incorrectly, it has turned out—that his readers would readily make the connection between his brief notice of the revolts in 16.7.3 and his fuller discussion in 15.79.1.

STEPHEN RUZICKA
University of North Carolina
Greensboro

33. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus*, 40–41.

VENUS OR THE MUSE AS “ALLY” (LUCR. 1.24, SIMON. FRAG. ELEG. 11.20–22 W)

At *De Rerum Natura* 1.24 Lucretius says that he is eager for Venus to be his “ally” in the composition of his poem: *te studeo sociam scribendis versibus esse*. The word *socia* here has drawn little notice from commentators, but a recent suggestion by M. R. Gale and the publication of a papyrus containing portions of a poem by Simonides on the Battle of Plataea enable us to understand much more of the considerable resonance of this line in its context in Lucretius' poem. Scholars working on the new Simonides poem should also take note of the Lucretian borrowing.

Gale, in a book based on a dissertation written before the Simonides papyrus was published, notes that the word Lucretius applies to Venus' desired role here, *socia*, “ally,” would translate into Greek as ἐπίκουρος,¹ and of course it will soon be apparent that the philosopher Epicurus or Ἐπίκουρος is the guiding spirit of the poem to a greater extent than is Venus. The resulting association of Epicurus with a deity, for anyone who notices the bilingual pun, is consistent with and to some extent foreshadows the language later in the poem that more explicitly claims a kind of divine

1. M. R. Gale, *Myth and Poetry in Lucretius* (Cambridge, 1994), 137. Gale also cites the suggestion of J. Snyder, *Puns and Poetry in Lucretius' "de Rerum Natura"* (Amsterdam, 1980), 108 that at 3.1042 *ipse Epicurus obit decurso lumine vitae*, Lucretius' use of the word *decurso* suggests a pun between ἐπίκουρος and *curro*. Cf. also B. Frischer, *The Sculpted Word: Epicureanism and Philosophical Recruitment in Ancient Greece* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1982), 275–76, for the significance of Epicurus' name meaning “helper,” and the (tentative) suggestion that Epicurus may have chosen the name for himself.

For discussion, either in person or via electronic mail, related to this paper I thank Deborah Boedeker, David Sider, Don Fowler, and Kirk Summers; for careful reading of drafts I thank my colleagues Andrew Szegedy-Maszak and Marilyn Katz; and for numerous helpful comments I thank the Editor and referees of this journal.